(Excerpted from:) Situational Awareness:  Improving Emergency Decision-Making. by Cuny, Frederick C.




IMPROVING EMERGENCY DECISION-MAKING 
IN EMERGENCIES





Frederick C. Cuny 
INTERTECT
INTRODUCTION
One of the least understood subjects in emergency management is decision-making. For 
analysts of emergency operations, it is often difficult to determine the conditions under which 
decisions were made. Emergency operations are dramas played without a script and concealed 
behind self-serving reports and a lack of hard introspection and analysis. The actors in the 
drama are far more concerned with playing their roles than recording events and the various 
participants see different or even conflicting versions of the same activities. Therefore, it is all 
too easy for participants to gain an impression of events which is not borne out by subsequent 
reconstruction.
Emergency operations are surrounded by uncertainties and difficulties rapidly accumulate, 
often compounded by poor decisions made at an earlier point in the operation. These end up 
by producing what may be called "frictions" that tend to slow operations and reduce their 
effectiveness.
Five frictions can be identified. The first, and most important, is the political 
environment. Disasters are political events. The provision of assistance quickly becomes a 
contest for resources. The attitude of the government towards the victims can range from very 
supportive to benign neglect and, in many cases, can be openly hostile. Whatever the official 
attitude, significant obstacles and red tape can be expected that will slow relief operations and 
affect the ultimate success or failure of plans.
The second is less than perfect information about the overall situation — information 
which is vital to decision-making.
Third are the psychological pressures on the decisionmakers. In the immediate aftermath 
of a disaster when human lives are at stake, decisions must be made quickly and often key 
decision-makers are put in a situation where their choices literally mean life for some and death 
for others. Added to that burden are demands from many quarters: survivors, the homeless, 
the hungry, donors, the press, and scores of others. A decision-maker who is unsure of him or 
herself will soon be reduced to a near catatonic state and will find it more and more difficult to 
make decisions.
The fourth friction is the physical stress of prolonged emergency operations. Long hours 
in the field with little rest, protracted series of meetings, constant travel over rough roads, etc.,
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lead to fatigue and tend to lower the efficiency of the individual, reducing his or her 
performance.
The fifth friction is the demoralizing effect of the unexpected. Just when a 
decision-maker thinks that he or she has a situation under control, suddenly all is not as it 
seems. The classic case is that of a leader of a refugee assistance program. After procuring 
stockpiles of food for the refugees, a new influx of refugees in a group two or three times the 
size of the existing population, arrives unexpectedly. Suddenly, from a good operational 
position, the decision-maker finds himself or herself in a poor position to meet the needs of the 
people and, unable to procure sufficient food locally, must initiate a massive airlift to get food 
in time to prevent massive starvation. This sort of shock can paralyze a decision-maker and its 
affect cannot be overrated.
.The overall affect of these frictions is to lower the performance of the decision-maker 
by an unquantifiable amount, interrupting the smooth operation of the relief effort. To a great 
degree emergency operations are a matter of team work and just one member of the team 
performing below his or her best can jeopardize the entire effort.
How can we reduce the impact of these frictions, especially as they relate to the 
imperfect information and the impact of the unexpected? One method advocated by increasing 
the emergency manager’s situational awareness, or "SA". SA is a factor which minimizes these 
frictions, helping to overcome less than perfect information and helping the decision-maker to 
instinctively do the right thing under stress, anticipating and often avoiding the unexpected. If 
a decision-maker has a high level of SA, it should raise his or her effective performance by a 
considerable margin.
What is situational awareness? SA is a combination of many things but basically it is the 
ability of a decision-maker to keep track of events and foresee occurrences in the fast moving, 
dynamic environment of emergency operations. The decision-maker who can best handle a rapid 
rate of change survives. Situational awareness has little relationship to either managerial ability 
or experience — some of the best emergency managers have been on their first tour — although 
at a practical level, the right sort of experience certainly helps. SA can be called the decisive 
factor in leadership and it is this factor that we want to inculcate in emergency managers.
The purpose of this book is to lay down rules for emergency operations in a manner 
never before attempted. It says to the novice, this is what we expect of you and this is how you 
should do it. Here are some of the critical situations in which you can expect to find yourself 
and this is how the situation should develop. Having studied and absorbed the information, the 
emergency manager should then be able to see the situation and anticipate what is going to 
happen. Armed with this information, he or she should be better equipped to make decisions 
in a timely and decisive manner.
For the purposes of this discussion, situational awareness will be described as a technique 
for improving emergency decision-making. It provides a framework for identifying and
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analyzing recurring operational problems. Application of SA enables emergency managers to 
determine appropriate interventions and when and where to take them.
Developing situational awareness requires a two-part process. The first is situation 
analysis. This consists of:
1. identification of recurring relief problems or "scenarios";
2. identification of the decisions that were made by emergency managers during the 
course of a scenario, including the sequence or chain, of decisions and their 
timing;
3. identification of the assumptions upon which each decision was based and the 
outcome that the decision-maker expected as a result of the decision; and
4. comparison of the expectations with the actual results.
The second step may be called situation modification. This consists of applying 
corrective actions or measures to alter the outcome of a scenario. These modifications can be 
classified into two groups, those that work under best case scenarios, where the decision-maker 
is in charge from the very beginning, and worst case scenarios where the decision-maker must 
intervene to correct a deteriorating situation and alter a decision chain put into motion by earlier 
decisions made by others — in other words, to take corrective actions to alter the outcome.
It should be noted that bad decisions are often irreversible. Once a scenario is set in 
motion it may be impossible to change the outcome. (For the emergency management consultant 
it is important to recognize these for what they are and not to waste time or effort in trying to 
change the outcome for, ultimately, the client will resent the interference and the consultant may 
set up an adversarial relationship that will damage his or her effectiveness. Knowing where and 
when to intervene is the key to emergency consulting as well as to emergency leadership.)
The goal of situational awareness is to improve overall decision-making by emergency 
managers. This is accomplished principally by expanding the awareness of the emergency 
manager about the outcome of decisions he or she may make and the cause and effect 
relationships.
In emergencies, decision-making is carried out under three conditions: certainty, risk, 
and uncertainty. When a decision-maker knows or is certain of all the variables on an issue, 
"certainty" exists and accurate decisions should be possible. In practice, this condition is present 
only in long-term, established programs.
In some situations, a decision-makers can make a reliable estimate of the situation and 
base their decisions on the probability of an expected outcome. When estimates are made, a 
degree of risk is involved. In this case, experience is a major factor.
Uncertainty is the most difficult condition under which decisions must be made. It is the 
usual condition at the beginning of an operation and unless decision-making is sound, the entire
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outcome of the operation can be jeopardized.
Types of Decisions
In emergency management, decisions can be divided into routine, technically-guided, and 
non-routine decisions. If a problem or situation occurs often, a routine procedure is usually 
developed for solving it. These decisions are usually codified and become routine. These 
routine decisions, sometimes referred to as "programmed" decisions, are guided by policies, 
guidelines, or procedures (often known as standard operating procedures, or SOPs).
In many cases, determination of which course to choose is guided by technical factors 
beyond the control of the decision-maker. For example, if measles vaccine is required for a 
refugee population, a cold chain must be set up -- without a decision to set up the chain, the 
vaccines would be useless.
When problems are broad, novel and unanticipated, they require decisions that have not 
been covered in the organization’s planning, thus, they are said to be non-routine. 
Unfortunately, non-routine decisions must usually be made under conditions of risk or 
uncertainty.
To improve decision-making under these circumstances, most agencies try to structure 
the decision-making process or to provide a policy framework against which to evaluate choices. 
However, by teaching emergency managers to recognize an unfolding scenario, they can identify 
the point the scenario has reached and determine the decisions that have already been made, and 
then decide when, where and how (or if) to intervene. Our ultimate goal is to make tough 
decisions more routine by taking out the unknown, or unanticipated, elements.
The Decision Chain
A key concept in emergency decision-making is the decision string or "chain." Each 
decision that is made sets the stage for subsequent decisions. If the initial decision is bad, every 
subsequent decision is marginalized. Progressively the emergency manager is faced with having 
to choose between "least worse choices" and ultimately runs out of options. In subsequent 
chapters, we shall attempt to diagram some decision chains and identify at what point good 
choices run out. In some cases corrective measures can be taken for a fairly long time without 
penalty, in others, least worse choices soon predominate and, in too many, once the initial 
decision is made there is no possible way to influence or prevent a disastrous outcome.
By using the situational awareness technique, the emergency management consultant 
should be able to help the decision-maker realize that the penalties for poor decisions are high. 
In least worse options, the trade-off literally becomes one of lives versus high capital costs. All 
too often, it is the lives that are sacrificed.
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SCENARIO I
MEASLES IN FOOD EMERGENCIES
(■
Introduction
One of the major killers in famines is measles. Epidemics have broken out in camps on 
every continent, but have been especially devastating in Africa. In 1985, in the refugee camps 
of Sudan and the famine camps of Ethiopia, measles, coupled with high rates of malnutrition, 
were responsible for pushing death rates to an unprecedented level, as high as 14 per 10,000 per 
day, a level almost seven times higher than any previously recorded mortality rate.
Typical Scenario
A typical scenario is as follows: During the initial stages of a famine, decision-makers 
concentrate on food, water, shelter and providing medical attention to combat the diseases 
already present among the refugee population. Suddenly measles is detected and the 
decision-makers order measles vaccine. It takes several weeks for the vaccine to arrive and for 
a cold chain to be established. Immunizations are eventually carried out in the camps where 
measles are reported with the immunization efforts following the various outbreaks as they 
spread throughout the famine zone. Despite all efforts, death rates remain high.
Analysis
Despite- the fact that measles is a major killer, situational awareness among 
decision-makers about this disease and how to fight it is universally low among not only are 
emergency managers deficient in this respect, many of the medical personnel to whom they turn 
for advice are also unknowledgeable. In 1984 in eastern Sudan, expatriate medical were urged 
teams to begin immunization campaigns before measles broke out in the camps. At the time 
measles was unreported, and universally the medical personnel responded that measles was "only 
a childhood disease" and should not be given precedence over other, more immediate, life-saving 
medical activities. It was also stated that if the disease were to breakout it could "be quickly 
controlled by immunization".
It is true that in the more technologically advanced societies measles is a disease that is 
generally regarded more as a nuisance than as life-threatening. Most medical schools fail to 
emphasize that in the Third World it is still a major killer, especially among those elements of 
the society where malnutrition rates are high. If a malnourished child or even an adult contracts 
the disease, the chances are better than 50 - 50 that death will result.
Specifically, there is a general lack of awareness of:
1. measles epidemiology, especially the pattern of transmission;
2. the purpose of the vaccine; and
3. the need for, or how to execute, a proper cold chain.
Another contributing factor is that there is also little awareness about the cyclic nature 
of the disease. In other words, the fact that in many areas of the world measles recurs at 
approximately two year intervals.
Information Needs
It is important to understand the transmission mechanism and the purpose of the vaccine. 
Measles is spread as an aerosol. When an infected person breaths, the disease is expelled on 
small droplets of moisture. When someone in close proximity inhales the aerosol, he or she 
ingests the virus and it immediately begins to incubate. Incubation normally takes a period of 
ten days to two weeks before the disease presents and outward signs of the infection are 
noticeable. During the incubation period, the person who is infected can also infect others. 
This is an extremely important point to note, for it means that the disease can be spreading up 
to ten days before it is detected. In a camps or feeding centers where interpersonal contact is 
increased by convergence of people for gathering water, food, firewood, etc., standing in line 
for medicine, and just through living in multi-family shelters, everyone can be exposed to the 
disease before it is detected.
The purpose of the vaccine is also almost universally misunderstood. Its purpose is not 
to cure measles, but to prevent it. The vaccine is essentially for the purpose of giving the 
patient a controlled case of the disease that is low intensity and not life threatening. This means 
that the person has to receive the vaccine and have his mild case before coming in contact with 
a more virulent strain of the disease. Again, the vaccine is preventive, not curative. The 
perception by most relief administrators, and indeed by a surprising number of medical 
personnel; that measles can be cured by the vaccine creates an unwarranted expectation that the 
disease can be controlled after an outbreak occurs. Unfortunately, by the time it is detected in 
a specific population, it is usually too late to take action for that group.
Generally, decision-makers are unaware of:
1. the potential impact of the disease;
2. the threat of the disease and its recurring (biennial) recurrence:
3. the purpose of the vaccine; and
4. epidemiological control strategies.
The largest contributing factor to a failure to control the disease is the false expectation 
emergency managers that the vaccine can be used to "cure" the disease once it has been 
detected.
The Decision Chain
The diagram in Figure 2 depicts a typical decision chain that leads to high mortality. At 
the point where the disease is detected, the decision-maker enters the zone of "least worse 
choice" options. He or she must immediately initiate an expanded immunization effort, not only 
to the famine affected population, but also to surrounding communities, and to all host country 
nationals who may be entering the camps and mingling with the refugee population. Some 
vaccine will also have to be targeted to communities which already have been affected, but 
where the disease is still undetected in hopes of controlling an outbreak in that community. In 
cases where refugees have been transferred from one camp to another, this is at best a hopeful 
strategy only. In all likelihood, the disease is already there, but until it is confirmed, chances 
cannot be taken, and valuable resources must be expended. If the disease presents, then 
immunization should stop immediately, and be shifted to other areas.
By analyzing the decision chain it can be seen that most elements of the chain are not 
decisions, but rather a failure to make decisions or take action at the proper time. A failure to 
make a decision or take action is a decision in itself.
Note that the "window of opportunity" for making a successful intervention is relatively 
narrow — for all practical purposes, it is the period of time from the initial border crossing to 
the time when the famine victim is registered and "processed" into the camp or feeding center.
Corrective Measures
How can we increase the emergency manager’s situational awareness? First, relief 
administrators must be taught to determine at what point in the biennial cycle the famine is 
occurring. If it is in a peak year, immunization must take place immediately. If it is at the end 
of the peak period, slightly more time may be available.
Second, administrators must be taught to immunize all vulnerable groups in this case all 
who are malnourished or who have not been exposed to measles previously. If the influx is 
occurring in the high year of the measles cycle, heat stable vaccine should be procured since, 
in the immediate confusion of an emergency, it will be difficult to set up a viable and effective 
cold chain. If the emergency is occurring during the low period, the use of the normal measles 
vaccine is permissible, but only if measles have not been reported anywhere within a 1,000 
kilometer radius of the focus of the emergency and if suitable cold chain equipment can be made 
immediately available.
Third, if an outbreak occurs during an immunization campaign, immunization efforts 
must immediately be transferred to other areas, and a measles containment strategy must be put 
into affect. Only after camps and nearby settlements where the disease has not presented have 
been immunized should a manager elect to continue vaccinations in settlements where it has been 
confirmed.
Measles immunization is a first priority in all famines and should become a routine part
of every agency’s emergency response doctrine. Since measles vaccine is normally a live virus, 
it must be kept in a temperature-controlled environment from the time that the vaccine is 
manufactured until it reaches the patient’s arm. Maintaining a cold chain is not easy, and 
millions of dollars of vaccine are wasted annually because relief agencies fail to maintain the 
integrity of the cold chain in remote areas. In the Ethiopian famine, it took from November 
1984 until May 1985 to establish a workable system. It requires proper equipment and a 
dedicated staff with sole responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the chain. Without these, 
a cold chain will not work.
